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CRIMINAL LAW-THE CRUCIBLE OF ADVERSARIAL TESTING: 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND UNAUTHORIZED CON­
CESSIONS OF CLIENT'S GUILT 
INTRODUCTION 
During voir dire, Steven Abshier's court-appointed defense at­
torney told the prospective jury, "Steven Abshier committed child 
abuse murder and the State will prove it beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We are here for sentencing and sentencing only."1 Subse­
quently, the State of Oklahoma tried and sentenced Abshier to 
death for first-degree murder of a child.2 
While defending Joe Elton Nixon against charges of first­
degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and arson,3 defense counsel 
told the jury during his opening statement, "In this case, there 
won't be any question, none whatsoever, that my client ... caused 
Jeannie [sic] Bickner's death. Likewise, that fact will be proved to 
your satisfaction beyond any reasonable doubt."4 Nixon's counsel 
appeared to believe that, in this trial, the jury's most important 
function was not to determine his client's guilt or innocence, but to 
decide whether to sentence Nixon to death or to life in prison.5 
After refusing a plea bargain that would have required him to 
plead guilty to accomplice to second-degree murder, Anthony 
Anaya went to trial on a charge of accomplice to first-degree mur­
der.6 During the opening statement, his counsel told the jurors, 
"We're not asking for an acquittal."7 During closing argument, de­
fense counsel urged, "Please, please, please do as we're asking you: 
1. Abshier v. State, 28 P.3d 579, 593 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. 
Ct. 1548 (2002). 
2. [d. at 587. The child in question was Abshier's twenty-two month old daugh­
ter, Ashley. 
3. Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. 2000). 
4. Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1990) (alteration in original). 
5. [d. 
6. State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142 (N.H. 1991). 
7. [d. at 1144. 
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convict [Defendant] of being an accomplice to second degree mur­
der. He was bad."8 Anaya's counsel did not believe that he could 
credibly argue that Anaya was innocent of all charges,9 and so he 
entreated the jury to impose the penalty that would have resulted 
had Anaya accepted the plea-bargain. lO 
At Nazzaro Scarpa's trial for drug trafficking and unlawful dis­
tribution of cocaine, his attorney urged the jury to believe the testi­
mony of the prosecution's witnesses (DEA agents who witnessed 
the drug sales),ll and argued that Scarpa was neither a drug user 
nor a drug seller, but a "mere conduit" for the cocaine.12 This argu­
ment conceded the elements of the offense and "not only failed to 
assist in fashioning a defense but also cemented the prosecution's 
theory of the case."13 Apparently, Scarpa's defense counsel misun­
derstood the charged offense, and failed to realize that persons who 
knowingly serve as intermediaries in drug transactions are punisha­
ble under the law.14 
As these cases illustrate, defense counsel may concede the cli­
ent's guilt in a variety of contexts. The attorney may make an ex­
plicit admission while addressing the jury, or guilt may be implied 
more subtly, by counsel's failure to raise issues that the defendant 
considers exculpatory but that may seem less than credible to de­
fense counsel and the jury.IS Guilt may also be conceded by the 
manner in which counsel cross-examines prosecutorial witnesses at 
trial. I6 Such an admission may be the result of an inexperienced 
attorney's failure to understand the elements of the offense, as in 
Scarpa, or part of a well-reasoned strategy by experienced criminal 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 1143. 
10. Id. at 1144. 
11. Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1994). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 11. 
14. Id. at 10. 
15. See In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2001). In that case, 
during defendant's trial for the murder of his wife and his business partner, defense 
counsel "essentially chose to bargain for [Stenson'sjlife in the penalty phase by forfeit­
ing his innocence in the guilt phase." Id. at 26 (Sanders, J, dissenting). On appeal of his 
conviction, the defendant challenged his attorneys' failure to advance several argu­
ments which Stenson considered exculpatory, most notably, counsel's refusal (in light of 
convincing physical evidence implicating Stenson as the killer) to cross-examine the 
wife of one of the victims in such a way as to "lay the crime at her feet." Id. at 6. 
16. See State v. Wiplinger, 343 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Minn. 1984) (finding that coun­
sel's cross examination of victim and her grandmother impliedly conceded that defen­
dant molested the victim). 
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counsel aimed at appealing to a jury's mercy in sentencing, as in 
Nixon and Anaya. 
The critical issue in such cases is the extent to which a defense 
attorney's decision, expressly or impliedly, to admit a client's guilt is 
a tactical choice within the attorney's discretion, or whether the 
right to make such a decision is inextricably linked with a defen- . 
dant's constitutional rights such that an unauthorized admission of 
guilt by one's attorney may give rise to a claim of ineffective assis­
tance of counsel and may justify a new trial. 
This Note explores the tension between defense attorneys' lati­
tude in choosing trial strategy and criminal defendants' constitu­
tional rights in determining whether and by what means to mount a 
defense at trial. Part I describes the development of the effective 
assistance of counsel doctrine and current standards for evaluating 
the merit of effective assistance of counsel claims. Part II evaluates 
several principal cases that develop the polar positions in the 
courts' struggle to determine the proper judicial response when de­
fense counsel makes an unauthorized admission of guilt. Finally, 
Part III argues that existing notions of the collaborative nature of 
the attorney client relationship, constitutional protections sur­
rounding the entrance of guilty pleas, and public policy considera­
tions all establish the need for a clear rule that an attorney may not 
concede guilt without the defendant's consent. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF 

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE STANDARDS OF 

ApPELLATE REVIEW OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIMS 

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecu­
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense." For the past seventy years, the right to 
counsel has been interpreted as the right to effective assistance of 
counsel.17 
Historically, a variety of standards have been applied to assess 
whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel. At 
one time, the standard most frequently employed asked whether 
counsel's performance made the trial a "farce and mockery of jus­
17. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("It has long been 
recognized that the right of counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel."); 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that counsel must not be appointed 
"under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation 
and trial of the case"). 
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tice."18 Gradually, the "farce and mockery" standard gave way to 
an analysis of whether the lawyer's conduct equaled that of a "rea­
sonably competent attorney."19 
The Supreme Court did not provide guidance for assessing ef­
fective assistance of counsel challenges until 1984, when it decided 
. Strickland v. Washington 20 and United States v. Cronic.21 Both 
cases provide a different standard for evaluating effective assistance 
claims,22 and there is much disagreement among lower courts as to 
which standard should be applied to ineffective assistance claims 
stemming from defense counsel's unauthorized admission of guilt. 
This Note will examine both standards and address the different 
interpretations by the lower courts. 
A. The General Rule: Strickland v. Washington 
In Strickland v. Washington,23 a habeas corpus case wherein 
the defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel arising from 
his defense attorney's failure to defend him adequately during the 
sentencing phase of his capital murder trial,24 the Court established 
a two-prong test for determining whether counsel's assistance falls 
below the constitutional standard for effectiveness. To prevail on a 
Sixth Amendment claim, a defendant must demonstrate, first, that 
the attorney's performance "fell below an objective standard of rea­
sonableness,"25 and second, that "there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the pro­
ceeding would have been different. "26 The defendant is entitled to 
18. See United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949) (holding that "[a] 
lack of effective assistance of counsel must be of such a kind as to shock the conscience 
of the Court and make the proceedings a farce and mockery of justice"); see also Bot­
tiglio v. United States, 431 F.2d 930, 931 (1st Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Cofield v. United 
States, 263 F.2d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 360 U.S. 
472 (1959). 
19. See, e.g., Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding 
that "the time has come to declare that 'effective' assistance means 'reasonably compe­
tent assistance,' which we regard as a shorthand for the standard that the quality of a 
defense counsel's representation should be within the range of competence reasonably 
expected of attorneys in criminal cases"); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (en banc); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976). 
20. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
21. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
22. See discussion infra Parts LA, LB. 
23. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
24. Id. at 675. 
25. Id. at 688. 
26. ld. at 694. 
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a new trial only upon satisfaction of both elements.27 
The second prong of the Strickland standard is commonly 
known as the prejudice requirement: it requires that the defendant 
demonstrate not only that counsel erred, but that his case was 
prejudiced as a result. The Court defined a reasonable probability 
as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome 
[of the proceeding]."28 The Court established the reasonable 
probability standard as a middle ground between a lax standard 
that would merely require the defendant to demonstrate that coun­
sel's errors "had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the 
proceeding,"29 and a stringent standard that would require the de­
fendant to prove "that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than 
not altered the outcome in the case."30 In determining whether 
there is a reasonable probability of prejudice, a court reviewing an 
ineffectiveness claim must evaluate the case record in order to 
"consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury."31 
Although a "reasonable probability" of prejudice is by no 
means a precise standard, it is the first prong of the Strickland test, 
reasonableness of counsel's representation, that engenders debate 
in ineffectiveness claims arising out of unauthorized concessions of 
guilt by counsel. Courts disagree whether an unauthorized admis­
sion of guilt can ever be a reasonable trial strategy.32 
In defining the reasonableness standard of the first prong of 
the Strickland test, the Supreme Court endorsed the "reasonably 
effective assistance" standard that, by 1984, had been adopted by all 
the federal circuit courts and most state courtS.33 The Court de­
clined to delineate a more specific measure of attorney competence 
than the objective standard of reasonableness,34 observing that 
"any ... set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally pro­
tected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude coun­
27. Id. at 700. 
28. Id. at 694. 
29. Id. at 693. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 695. 
32. See discussion and principal cases infra Part II. 
33. Id. at 683. 
34. Id. at 688. The majority stated, "More specific guidelines are not appropriate. 
The Sixth Amendment refers simply to 'counsel,' not specifying particular requirements 
of effective assistance .... The proper measure of attorney performance remains sim­
ply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. Justice Brennan wrote 
that "[w]ith respect to the performance standard, I agree with the Court's conclusion 
that a 'particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct' would be inappropriate." 
Id. at 703 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting id. at 688). 
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sel must have in making tactical decisions. "35 
Under the Strickland analysis, "fj]udicial scrutiny of counsel's 
performance must be highly deferential. "36 In evaluating ineffec­
tive assistance claims, courts "must indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable pro­
fessional assistance. "37 The reasonableness prong requires the de­
fendant to overcome the "presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound 
trial strategy."'38 
Legal scholars tend to view the Court's deference to attorney 
strategy and its unwillingness to articulate specific standards of at­
torney conduct with favor. 39 Because there are myriad ways to pro­
vide effective assistance of counsel in any given case,40 courts have 
expressed fear that specific guidelines promulgated by the Supreme 
Court would deter defense counsel from providing innovative and 
vigorous advocacy.41 
However, in his vigorous dissent to Strickland, Justice Marshall 
criticized the Court's deferential stance with respect to attorney 
performance: 
My objection to the performance standard adopted by the Court 
is that it is so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no 
grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which 
the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different 
35. Id. at 689. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be 
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at 
the time." Id. 
38. Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955». 
39. See, e.g., Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old 
Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 9,86 (1986) (stating that "at this 
stage of development of the law on ineffective assistance, the difficulty of articulating a 
comprehensive list of duties justifies the Court's reluctance to constitutionalize any spe­
cific directives to counsel"). 
40. For a discussion of the different variables that a criminal defense attorney has 
to measure, see, for example, Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance 
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 343 (1983). 
41. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. See also State v. Piche, 430 P.2d 522, 526 
(Wash. 1967). 
To assure the defendant of counsel's best efforts ... the law must afford the 
attorney a wide latitude and flexibility in his choice of trial psychology and 
tactics. If counsel is to be stultified at trial by a post trial scrutiny of the myr­
iad choices he must make in the course of a trial ... he will lose the very 
freedom of action so essential to a skillful representation of the accused. 
Id. 
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courts. To tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a 
criminal defendant must behave "reasonably" and must act like 
"a reasonably competent attorney" ... is to tell them almost 
nothing. In essence, the majority has instructed judges called 
upon to assess claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to ad­
vert to their own intuitions regarding what constitutes "profes­
sional" representation, and has discouraged them from trying to 
develop more detailed standards governing the performance of 
defense counsel. In my view, the Court has thereby not only ab­
dicated its own responsibility to interpret the Constitution, but 
also impaired the ability of the lower courts to exercise theirs.42 
In the years since the Strickland standard was announced, 
these words have proven prophetic, at least with respect to ineffec­
tive assistance claims arising out of unauthorized concessions of 
guilt by defense counsel. While courts seem to recognize that the 
vast majority of ineffective assistance claims must be evaluated ac­
cording to the two prongs of the Strickland test-unreasonably de­
ficient performance and prejudice-there is widespread 
disagreement among the courts about how to evaluate a situation 
where the defense attorney admits guilt without the client's 
consent. 
In such a situation, the Strickland analysis appears not to fit, 
because that test is tailored to claims of "actual ineffectiveness" of 
counsel's assistance.43 A claim of ineffectiveness generally chal­
lenges counsel's preparation (i.e., whether counsel adequately in­
vestigated, researched, interviewed witnesses, filed motions, et 
cetera) or performance at trial (i.e., whether counsel cross-ex­
amined witnesses, presented mitigating evidence, made a closing 
statement).44 Other claims challenge grossly unprofessional con­
duct such as being intoxicated,45 using drugs,46 or sleeping through 
42. Strickland, 466 u.s. at 707-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
43. Id. at 683. 
44. For compilations of ineffective assistance claims, see generally JOHN M. 
BURKOFF & HOPE HUDSON, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1-3 (1994); LARRY 
FASSLER, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (1993). See also Gary Goodpaster, 
The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal 
Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59 (1986); Barbara R. Levine, Preventing 
Defense Counsel Error-An Analysis of Some Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
and Their Implications for Professional Regulation, 15 U. ToL. L. REV. 1275 (1984). 
45. See, e.g., Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 930 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
although defendant alleged that counsel had been intoxicated during trial and counsel 
entered an alcohol treatment program after trial, there were no specific instances of 
deficient conduct by counsel); Fowler v. Parratt, 682 F.2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (rul­
322 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:315 
tria1.47 Some claims simply allege ineffective assistance because 
counsel did not have adequate experience in criminal trials or did 
not have sufficient time to prepare a case.48 
Contrast with these cases the ineffective assistance claim raised 
in Nixon v. Singletary.49 In that case, defense counsel was an exper­
ienced attorney whose strategy, in admitting the defendant's guilt, 
was praised by the trial judge as being the defendant's best hope of 
avoiding the death penalty.50 The reasonableness of counsel's strat­
egy in this situation would likely have been beyond reproach-if 
the defendant had consented to the tactic. He did not,51 and the 
Strickland analysis of reasonable performance and prejudice ap­
pears inadequate to address the issue of whether his attorney's ad­
mission-though well-intentioned and an objectively good 
strategy-nevertheless violated the defendant's constitutional 
rights. 
When faced with a scenario like that raised in Nixon, courts 
struggle with whether to apply the Strickland analysis or one of the 
ing that although defense counsel admitted being an alcoholic and suffering blackouts 
during trial, there was no evidence that it affected his representation of defendant). 
46. See, e.g., Young v. Zant, 727 F.2d 1489, 1492-93 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
even though counsel had an admitted drug problem, there was no showing of ineffective 
assistance ). 
47. See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (af­
firming district court holding that "sleeping counsel is equivalent to no counsel at all"), 
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2347 (2002); Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 833-34 (9th Cir. 
1984) (finding ineffective assistance where counsel slept through substantial portions of 
the trial); McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding 
no ineffective assistance where counsel slept through parts of trial, and opining that co­
counsel may have let the attorney sleep as a strategic choice aimed at gaining jurors' 
sympathy for defendant), overruled on other grounds by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 
249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 
48. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 663-66 (1984) (alleging inef­
fective assistance where defense attorney had no previous experience with jury trials or 
criminal law and had twenty-five days to prepare a case that took the government four 
and one-half years to investigate); Avery v. Procunier, 750 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that counsel was not ineffective even though appointed the morning of trial). 
49. 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000). See discussion infra Parts II.B, III.B. 
50. [d. at 630 (Wells, J., dissenting). Justice Wells quoted a statement by the trial 
judge lauding the defense attorney's methods: 
It is my view that the tactic employed by trial counsel in this case was an 
excellent analysis of [ the] reality of his case and the preservation of his credi­
bility.... A less experienced attorney, probably seeking to avoid criticism ... 
would have tried the case differently, and probably would have left no hope at 
all for Mr. Nixon. 
Id. 
51. Nixon was disruptive and uncooperative at trial. Id. at 625. He refused to 
attend the majority of the trial and was not present when his attorney made the state­
ments that formed the basis of his appeal. Id. at 620 n.3. 
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three recognized exceptions to that standard.52 The most common 
exception is the "surrounding circumstances" standard articulated 
in United States v. Cronic,53 decided by the Supreme Court on the 
same day as Strickland. 
B. The "Surrounding Circumstances" Exception: United States 
v. Cronic and Meaningful Adversarial Testing 
Where the Strickland standard evaluates the reasonableness 
and the prejudicial effect of specific counsel errors, the Cronic stan­
dard looks to the adequacy of counsel's overall performance in the 
context of the surrounding circumstances of the case.54 The Cronic 
standard applies to a limited category of cases "in which the sur­
rounding circumstances made it so unlikely that any lawyer could 
provide effective assistance that ineffectiveness [is] properly pre­
sumed without inquiry into actual performance at trial."55 The 
Court identified three trial situations that implicate Cronic analy­
sis.56 The first and "[m]ost obvious" situation is the "complete de­
nial of counsel" during a critical stage of the proceeding.57 The 
52. Each of the three exceptions to the Strickland test presumes prejudice rather 
than requiring the defendant to demonstrate that, but for counsel's admission, he or she 
would not have been convicted. In addition to the "surrounding circumstances" excep­
tion discussed, infra Part I.B, the Supreme Court articulated a conflict of interest excep­
tion in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Under this test, the defendant must 
demonstrate (1) that his attorney "actively represented conflicting interests" and (2) 
that the "actual conflict of interest affected his lawyer's performance." Id. at 350. 
The third exception to Strickland is the "irreconcilable conflict" standard recog­
nized by the Ninth Circuit. This standard applies specifically to the situation where a 
conflict develops between counsel and the defendant such that "the relationship be­
tween lawyer and client completely collapses." In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16 
P.3d 1, 9 (Wash. 2001) (citing United States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 
1998». 
For more information on the "irreconcilable conflict" standard, see, for example, 
Moore, 159 F.3d at 1154 (finding per se prejudice where motion to substitute counsel 
was denied after defendant threatened to sue counsel for malpractice and counsel effec­
tively stopped working on defendant's defense); United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 
1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979) (presuming prejudice where attorney-client relationship was 
a "stormy one with quarrels, bad language, threats, and counter-threats"); Brown v. 
Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970) (presuming prejudice where defendant went to 
trial with attorney with whom he would not cooperate or communicate, because the 
court found that defense was perfunctory, and that it would not be unreasonable to 
believe that, had defendant been represented by an attorney with whom he had a better 
relationship, he would have been convicted of a lesser offense). 
53. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
54. See id. at 666 n.41. 
55. Id. at 66l. 
56. Id. at 658-59. See also Bell v. Cone, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1850-51 (2002). 
57. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. 
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Court has used the phrase "critical stage"58 to "denote a step of a 
criminal proceeding ... that [holds] significant consequences for the 
accused."59 The absence of counsel at a critical stage of the trial 
may be actual or constructive.60 
Second, a trial is presumptively unfair under Cronic "if counsel 
entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adver­
sarial testing."61 In Bell v. Cone,62 the Supreme Court clarified this 
statement by concluding, "When we spoke in Cronic of the possibil­
ity of presuming prejudice based on an attorney's failure to test the 
prosecutor's case, we indicated that the attorney's failure must be 
complete."63 
Finally, "where counsel is called upon to render assistance 
under circumstances where competent counsel very likely could 
not,"64 the Cronic standard applies. As an example of such a case, 
the Court cited Powell v. Alabama,65 a highly publicized capital 
rape trial in which the trial judge appointed "all the members of the 
bar" to represent the defendants rather than appointing a single at­
torney.66 The Court held that this designation of counsel "was ei­
58. Id. 
59. Bell, 122 S. Ct. at 1851 n.3 and accompanying text. Whether a proceeding is a 
"critical stage" depends upon an analysis of "whether potential substantial prejudice to 
defendant's rights inheres in the ... confrontation and the ability of counsel to help 
avoid that prejudice." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). The Supreme 
Court has identified a number of "critical stages" throughout a criminal proceeding. 
See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1250 (2002) (appointment of counsel to 
indigent defendants and the opportunity for pretrial consultation with counsel); Michi­
gan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (interrogation after the defendant asserts the 
right to counsel); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470-71 (1981) (pretrial psychiatric ex­
aminations); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975) (closing argument); Cole­
man v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (preliminary hearing to fix bail); Wade, 388 
U.S. at 227 (pretrial identification lineup); Mempa v. Rbay, 389 U.S. 128, 129 (1967) 
(sentencing); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (jury selection), overruled on 
other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
59, 60 (1963) (preliminary hearing to enter plea); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 
(1961) (arraignment). 
60. Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 1994) (Beezer, J., 
concurring). 
61. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. 
62. 122 S. Ct. 1843 (2002). 
63. Id. at 1851 (emphasis added). 
64. Bell, 122 S. Ct. at 1851 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-62). 
65. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
66. In Powell, three black defendants were charged with the highly publicized 
rape of two white women. Id. at 49. The trial judge appointed "all the members of the 
bar" to arraign them, but on the morning of trial, the only attorney to appear for the 
defense was a lawyer from Tennessee, who had not had time to prepare for the case or 
to familiarize himself with Alabama procedure, and therefore stated he was unwilling to 
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ther so indefinite or so close upon the trial as to amount to a denial 
of effective and substantial aid in that regard."67 
The Cronic exception reflects the Supreme Court's recognition 
that the underlying purpose of the Constitution's guarantee of ef­
fective assistance of counsel is to ensure truth and fairness through 
adversarial testing.68 Partisan advocacy on both sides of a case is 
the "very premise" of our criminal justice system.69 That premise 
"underlies and gives meaning to the Sixth Amendment. It is meant 
to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process."70 Thus, the 
purpose of the Cronic standard is to evaluate whether counsel's 
performance "require[ d] the prosecution's case to survive the cruci­
ble of meaningful adversarial testing."71 If the reviewing court ex­
amines the trial record and determines that counsel's performance 
did not meet this standard, prejudice is presumed,n and the defen­
dant is granted a new trial. 
C. Debating the Scope of the Cronic Exception 
There is debate over how narrowly to limit the category of 
cases to which the Cronic standard should appropriately be applied. 
Several courts apply Cronic review when defense counsel concedes 
guilt or absence of reasonable doubt without the defendant's con­
sent, on the theory that to do so "entirely fails to subject the prose­
cution's case to meaningful adversarial testing."73 
represent the defendants. Id. at 56-57. The attorney was appointed anyway, to be pro­
vided with voluntary assistance from the local bar, and trial proceeded without delay. 
Id. at 57. 
67. Id. at 53. 
68. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 655-56. 
69. Id. at 655. 
70. Id. at 655-56 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981». 
71. Id. at 656. 
72. Prejudice is presumed because failure to submit the prosecution's charges to 
adversarial testing is a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assis­
tance of counsel. "When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted-even if 
defense counsel may have made demonstrable errors-the kind of testing envisioned by 
the Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confron­
tation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated." Id. at 656-57. 
73. See United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659) (applying Cronic review where defense counsel conceded, dur­
ing closing argument, that no reasonable doubt existed regarding the only factual issues 
in dispute); Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000) (presuming prejudice where 
counsel admitted defendant's guilt in an attempt to persuade the jury not to sentence 
his client to death); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1147 (N.H. 1991) (fmding prejudice 
per se where counsel urged the jury to convict his client of a lesser-included offense, 
even though his client had refused to plea to that offense and had testified to his com­
plete innocence); State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 507 (N.C. 1985) (holding that 
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The above approach, however, has vocal detractors who be­
lieve that the Cronic test should be applied to an extremely narrow 
category of cases. In Scarpa v. Dubois ,74 the First Circuit criticized 
what it considered a trend toward overextending the Cronic 
exception: 
A few courts have extended the exception's boundaries be­
yond the circumstances surrounding representation and found 
that a lawyer's particular errors at trial may cause a breakdown 
in the adversarial system and thus justify invocation of the Cronic 
dictum. We believe that these cases misperceive the rationale 
underlying the Cronic exception. In our view, the Court's lan­
guage in Cronic was driven by the recognition that certain types 
of conduct are in general so antithetic to effective assistance-for 
example, lawyers who leave the courtroom for long stretches of 
time during trial are unlikely to be stellar advocates in any mat­
ter-that a case-by-case analysis simply is not worth the cost of 
protracted litigation. No matter what the facts of a given case 
may be, this sort of conduct will almost always result in prejudice. 
But attorney errors particular to the facts of an individual case 
are qualitatively different. Virtually by definition, such errors 
"cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing 
prejudice" or "defined with sufficient precision to inform defense 
attorneys correctly just what conduct to avoid." Consequently, 
the Court has declined to accord presumptively prejudicial status 
to them.75 
The Scarpa court predicted that overextending the Cronic ex­
ception would requite an inquiry into the facts of individual cases, 
thus requiring litigation to determine initially whether the Cronic 
test applies76 and defeating the purpose of the exception, which is 
to presume prejudice where the attorney's ineffectiveness is so pa­
tently egregious that litigation to establish it is unnecessary.77 
"when counsel to the surprise of his client admits his client's gUilt, the harm is so likely 
and so apparent that the issue of prejudice need not be addressed"). 
74. 38 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994). 
75. Id. at 12-13 (citations omitted). 
76. /d. at 14. 
77. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 661 (1984) (holding that prejudice 
should only be presumed in cases where "the surrounding circumstances made it so 
unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance that ineffectiveness [is] prop­
erly presumed without inquiry into actual performance at trial"). The Court recognized 
that while the burden of demonstrating a constitutional violation in counsel's perform­
ance generally rests on the accused, there are "circumstances that are so likely to 
prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjusti­
fied." Id. at 658. 
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II. PRINCIPAL CASES 
This Part presents the development of a circuit split regarding 
the scope of the Cronic exception. Section A introduces the federal 
circuit cases that best articulate the polar positions in interpreting 
Cronic's per se prejudice standard. Section B explores how the de­
bate has been expanded in state courts and examines the two most 
common scenarios that give rise to a defense attorney's tactical de­
cision to admit the defendant's guilt. Finally, Section C evaluates a 
case in which the two-prong Strickland analysis remains the appro­
priate standard despite defense counsel's concession of guilt. 
A. 	 The Federal Circuit Split: United States v. Swanson and 
Scarpa v. Dubois 
1. Cronic Broadly Interpreted: United States v. Swanson78 
In February 1989, Brent Paul Swanson was indicted on one 
count of bank robbery,19 Swanson initially pleaded guilty, but with­
drew his plea after learning that he would be sentenced as a career 
offender.80 At trial, Swanson's court-appointed counsel rested after 
the prosecution's case in chief, without calling any witnesses.81 
During closing argument, Swanson's attorney asserted that a 
defense attorney's "job" was to raise reasonable doubt.82 Never­
theless, the attorney went on to make several statements to the ef­
fect that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution's witnesses 
did not "[come] to the level ofraising reasonable doubt."83 He told 
the jury that the evidence against his client was "overwhelming,"84 
and concluded his closing argument by saying, "And if {Swanson] is 
proven guilty, don't hesitate in saying so and when you go home to­
night don't ever look back and say 'Did I do the right thing?' If your 
conscience dictates that that was the right thing to do, you have 
done your part."85 
Following Swanson's conviction, his case came before the 
Ninth Circuit in a habeas corpus proceeding alleging ineffective as­
sistance of counsel because his attorney conceded in his closing ar­
78. 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991). 
79. Id. at 1071. 
80. Id. 
81. [d. 
82. Id. at 1077. The full text of defense counsel's closing argument is attached as 
an appendix to the Swanson opinion. Id. at 1076-78. 
83. Id. 
84. [d. 
85. [d. at 1078. 
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gument "that there was no reasonable doubt regarding the only 
factual issues in dispute."86 The Ninth Circuit, though recognizing 
that the prejudice standard established in Strickland is the general 
test of ineffective assistance of counsel claims,87 decided that the 
circumstances of Swanson justified application of the Cronic 
exception.88 
The Ninth Circuit held that Swanson's defense counsel's con­
duct "caused a breakdown in our adversarial system"89 for several 
reasons. First, defense counsel's statements lessened the govern­
ment's burden of proof9o and "tainted the integrity of the trial."91 
Second, the court held that "[t]he concession that there was no rea­
sonable doubt ... was an abandonment of the defense of his client 
at a critical stage92 of the proceedings. "93 
The court commented, "We cannot envision a situation more 
damaging to an accused than to have his own attorney tell the jury 
that there is no reasonable doubt that his client was the person who 
committed the conduct that constituted the crime charged in the 
indictment."94 Indeed, the court so strongly believed that Swan­
son's counsel's conduct was indefensible that it directed its clerk to 
provide the State Bar of Arizona with a copy of the Swanson opin­
ion so that the attorney involved would be sanctioned for 
negligence.95 
2. Cronic Narrowly Interpreted: Scarpa v. Dubois96 
During the summer of 1987, a Boston-based DEA agent posing 
as a cocaine purchaser met several times with his initial target, Rob­
86. [d. at 1072. 
87. Id. 
88. [d. at 1074 (holding that defense counsel's conduct "caused a breakdown in 
our adversarial system of justice in this case that compels an application of the Cronic 
exception to the Strickland requirement of a showing that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different without counsel's errors or omissions") (citing Cronic, 466 
U.S. at 659-60). 
89. Id. 
90. Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1075 (stating that, "[b]y arguing that no reasonable 
doubt existed regarding the only factual issues in dispute, [defense counsel] shouldered 
part of the Government's burden of persuasion"). 
91. [d. at 1074. 
92. See supra note 59 for a discussion of what constitutes a "critical stage." 
93. Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1074 (citing Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) 
(holding that closing argument is a "critical stage"». 
94. [d. at 1075. 
95. [d. at 1076. 
96. 38 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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ert Ricupero.97 Petitioner Nazzaro Scarpa accompanied Ricupero 
to these meetings.98 At the first meeting, Scarpa handed drugs to 
Ricupero, who handed them to the DEA agent.99 The agent then 
gave Ricupero $1,500 in cash, which Ricupero, after taking a $100 
share for himself, gave to Scarpa. IOO At the second meeting, Scarpa 
and Ricupero were joined by James Marcella, who handed a pack­
age containing cocaine to Scarpa, who passed it to Ricupero, who in 
turn gave it to the agent: the money then passed from the agent, to 
Ricupero, to Scarpa, and lastly back to Marcella.101 
Following these transactions, the Commonwealth of Massachu­
setts indicted Scarpa for drug trafficking and unlawful distribu­
tion.1°2 He was convicted and sentenced to a lengthy prison term. 
After exhausting his state law claims,103 he filed an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.1°4 The district court 
applied the Cronic analysis and granted the petition, finding that 
"defense counsel's performance not only fell below an objectively 
reasonable standard of proficiency but also caused a breakdown in 
the adversarial system. This ... constituted prejUdice per se."105 
Pursuant to these findings, the district court vacated the conviction 
and ordered Scarpa released from state custody.106 
The.district court noted several misgivings about defense coun­
sel's performance. While the prosecution presented its case prima­
rily through two witnesses, a DEA agent and a Boston police 
detective,l07 defense counsel cross-examined only the DEA agent, 
did not attempt to impeach him, and did not call witnesses in 
Scarpa's defense.108 Instead, his closing argument urged the jury to 
accept the government's testimony as truth.109 Counsel said III 
closing: 
What happened to that money? What was its final destin a­






103. See Commonwealth v. Scarpa, 571 N.E.2d 28 (Mass. 1991), affg 567 N.E.2d 
1268 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
104. Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 5. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. At the time of argument before the First Circuit, Scarpa was not 
incarcerated. 
107. Id. at 9. 
108. Id. 
109. [d. 
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tion? Is Scarpa a user of drugs? Is Scarpa someone that 
Ricupero, the target of the investigation-is Scarpa-was he 
used by Ricupero to shield himself? . . . And I'm suggesting to 
you-again, at the expense of being repetitious, Scarpa is not 
found-and it is undetermined-that is the word that Agent 
Desmond used on July 8th-it's undetermined if Scarpa had any 
of that money .... And clearly, the source of the cocaine on the 
8th was not Scarpa. At best he was a conduit; someone through 
whom it passed, and through whom the money passed.110 
Although the First Circuit agreed with the district court's find­
ing that the defense counse1's argument "effectively conceded the 
only disputed elements of the ... crimes and relieved the prosecu­
tion of its burden of proof,"111 and that counsel's performance was 
objectively unreasonable, the court nevertheless reversed the judg­
ment because the district court reacheo its decision by inappropri­
ately applying the Cronic test rather than Strickland analysis. llz 
The First Circuit had several justifications for its decision not 
to apply the Cronic exception to Scarpa's counse1's errors,1l3 but 
one of the court's reasons bears further discussion. The First Cir­
cuit cited recent Supreme Court cases that held that "trial errors"114 
110. Id. at 10. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 14. 
113. Id. at 13-15. Those reasons not discussed in the text are: the court's belief 
that the Supreme Court did not intend Cronic to be broadly expanded, id. at 14; the 
court's fear that broad application of Cronic would "replace case-by-case litigation over 
prejudice with case-by-case litigation over prejudice per se," id.; and the court's desire 
to protect the State's interest in the finality of jury verdicts and the related goal of 
avoiding the loss of time and resources required to retry cases, id. at 15. 
114. A trial error occurs "during the presentation of the case to the [trier of fact], 
and which may therefore be qualitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 
presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasona­
ble doubt." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,307-08 (1991). See Clemons v. Mis­
sissippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752-54 (1990) (overbroad jury instructions at the sentencing stage 
of a capital case); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989) (jury instruction con­
taining an erroneous conclusive presumption); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258­
60 (1988) (admission of evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital case violated de­
fendant's Sixth Amendment rights); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-504 (1987) (jury 
instruction misstating an element of the offense); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 584 
(1986) (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption); Crane v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986) (erroneous exclusion of defendant's testimony re­
garding the circumstances of his confession); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 
684 (1986) (restriction on a defendant's right to cross-examine a witness for bias in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 
114,117-118, & n.2 (1983) (denial of a defendant's right to be present at trial); United 
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (improper comment on defendant's silence at 
trial, in violation of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause); Hopper v. Evans, 
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are properly analyzed by harmless-error standards, which require 
the defendant to demonstrate prejudice, while "structural errors" 
defy harmless-error analysisPS Structural errors are fundamental 
errors that disturb the framework of the trial116 and thus necessitate 
"automatic reversal of the conviction because they infect the entire 
trial piocess."117 Structural errors include the total deprivation of 
the right to counsel,118 failure to give a sufficient "reasonable 
doubt" instruction,119 and race-based discrimination in jury selec­
tion.no Trial errors come in far more varieties,121 but "all such er­
rors occur 'during the presentation of the case to the jury,' and 
therefore may 'be quantitatively assessed in the context of [the] evi­
dence presented' in order to gauge harmlessness."122 
The First Circuit held that Scarpa's attorney's conduct was 
analogous to a trial error123 because, "[l]ike the line separating trial 
errors from structural errors, the line past which prejudice will be 
presumed in cases involving claims of ineffective assistance ought to 
be plotted to exclude cases in which a detailed contextual analysis is 
required."124 Put another way, the court seems to suggest that in 
cases where a review of the trial record enables the court to weigh 
the severity of defense counsel's errors-in this case, concession of 
reasonable doubt-against the overall fairness of the trial, it would 
not be judicially advisable to presume prejudice. 
The First Circuit analyzed Scarpa's counsel's errors in the con­
text of the whole record, including the facts of the case, the tran­
456 u.s. 605 (1982) (statute improperly forbidding trial court's giving a jury instruction 
on a lesser-included offense in a capital case in violation of the Due Process Clause); 
Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (failure to instruct the jury on the presump­
tion of innocence); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (unconstitutional admis­
sion of identification evidence); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973) 
(admission of the out-of-court statement of a non testifying codefendant); Milton v. 
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (confession obtained in violation of Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970) (admis­
sion of illegally obtained evidence); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970) (de­
nial of counsel at a preliminary bail hearing). 
115. Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 14 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 
(1993), and Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-08 (1991)). 
116. Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 14. 
117. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629-30. 
118. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
119. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
120. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-62 (1986) (grand jury); Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (petit jury). 
121. See supra note 114. 
122. Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 14 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
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script of proceedings, exhibits, and applicable substantive law.125 
The court held "that Strickland controls inquiries concerning coun­
sel's actual performance at trial, and that substandard performance, 
in the nature of particular attorney errors, cannot conclusively be 
presumed to have been prejudicial."126 
Under Strickland analysis, Scarpa's failure to demonstrate 
prejudice was fatal to his case.127 The First Circuit cited several 
reasons why prejudice had not been demonstrated in this case: the 
one-sidedness of the evidence in the prosecution's favor,128 the fact 
that defense counsel's "conduit" argument conceded only facts that 
were "overwhelmingly supported" by the government's evi­
dence,129 and Scarpa's ongoing failure to "identify any promising 
line of defense. "130 
Although the First Circuit's narrow interpretation of Cronic 
led it to apply the Strickland standard in Scarpa, the court did not 
entirely disregard the more expansive Cronic interpretation. In a 
footnote, the court stated that "[e]ven if one were to accept the 
expansive view of Cronic . .. the record here simply does not justify 
a finding of a complete failure to subject the prosecution's case to 
meaningful adversarial testing."131 The court then catalogued the 
few positive aspects of the defense attorney's representation,132 and 
concluded that the record did not demonstrate "such a deliberate 
rolling over as might warrant a finding of an absolute breakdown of 
the adversarial process. "133 
Finally, one fact-determinative difference sets Scarpa apart 
from cases applying the broadly interpreted Cronic exception: 
Scarpa's attorney never expressly admitted his client's guilt. Per­
haps conceding reasonable doubt through a theory of defense that 
is ignorant of the substantive law is not as "deliberate [a] rolling 
over"134 as an outright admission of culpability. 
125. Id. at 15. 
126. Id. 




131. Id. at 15 n.8. 
132. Specifically, defense counsel focused his closing argument on the govern­
ment's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; he informed the jury that they 
could choose whether or not to believe witness testimony, and he urged the jurors that, 
in deciding the case, they must "have an abiding conviction." Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
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B. The Expanding Debate in the State Courts 
1. 	 Admitting Guilt to Lesser-Included Offenses: State v. 
Anaya135 
When representing defendants charged with serious offenses, 
attorneys sometimes tell the jury that the client is guilty of lesser­
included offenses in an attempt to prevent conviction on more seri­
ous charges.136 Courts are divided about whether to view the attor­
ney's conduct as constitutionally ineffective assistance or 
reasonable trial strategy.137 
In State v. Anaya, the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied 
the Cronic standard to overturn the defendant's accomplice to sec­
ond-degree murder charge without finding prejudice. Anaya's trial 
counsel's closing argument contained at least five requests for his 
conviction as an accomplice to second-degree murder, and for his 
acquittal on the charge of accomplice to first-degree murder.138 
Defense counsel pursued this strategy even though Anaya had re­
jected a negotiated plea on the second-degree charge and had taken 
the stand at trial to testify that he was "completely innocent."139 
Anaya's well-documented refusal to consent to counsel's strat­
egy140 was the dispositive factor in the court's decision to overturn 
his conviction. Although the court recognized that other courts 
faced with the situation where the attorney admits the client's guilt 
to a lesser-included offense generally "view the attorney's conduct 
as a sound strategical move made in the face of overwhelming evi­
dence of the defendant's guilt,"141 the court distinguished such 
cases142 on two grounds. First, those other defendants had not testi­
fied to their complete innocence, as Anaya had,143 and second, they 
135. 592 A.2d 1142 (N.H. 1991). 
136. See id; see also Haynes v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'd en bane, 
298 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc); McNeal v. Wainwright, 722 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 
1984); Faraga v. State, 514 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 1987); People v. Siverly, 551 N.E.2d 1040 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990), and Alexander v. State, 782 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
137. See Anaya, 592 A.2d at 1145-46. 
138. Id. at 1144. 
139. Id. 
140. In addition to testifying to his own innocence, "Anaya became so agitated 
during his attorney's closing argument" that co-counsel had to restrain him. Id. 
141. Id. at 1145. 
142. The cases distinguished by the court were McNeal v. Wainwright, 722 F.2d 
674 (11th Cir. 1984); People v. Siverly, 551 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Alexander 
v. State, 782 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); and Faraga v. State, 514 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 
1987). C/. Haynes v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'd en bane, 298 F.3d 375 (5th 
Cir. 2002). 
143. Anaya, 592 A.2d at 1146. 
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had not rejected an opportunity to plead to the lesser offense urged 
upon the jury by counsel.144 
Notably, the Anaya court did not hold that defense counsel 
must obtain the defendant's consent before pursuing a strategy that 
concedes guilt to a lesser offense, although some courts have.145 In­
stead, the court held only that counsel may not pursue such a strat­
egy over the defendant's objection.146 
Although the Anaya court applied the Cronic exception and 
did not require the defendant to prove prejudice, the decision is still 
troublesome. A defendant has a constitutional right not to tes­
tify,147 so making a defendant's testimony as to his innocence a de­
terminative factor in evaluating the validity of an ineffective 
assistance claim is problematic. Securing one's constitutional right 
to effective assistance of counsel should not be conditioned upon 
surrendering another constitutionally protected privilege. Like­
wise, the second factor considered by the Anaya court, the rejected 
plea-bargain, should not determine the success of the ineffective as­
sistance claim because the availability of a plea offer-and the op­
portunity to reject it-is completely outside the defendant's 
control. Instead, the only determinative factor should be whether 
or not the defendant consented to his attorney's strategy, and the 
defendant should be given an opportunity to express that consent 
on the record before the attorney concedes guilt-rather than re­
quiring the defendant to object to the strategy once the damage has 
been done. 
2. 	 Appealing to the Jury's Mercy: Admitting Guilt in 
Capital Crimes 
In capital cases, as in cases with lesser-included offenses, inef­
fective assistance of counsel claims may arise out of a defense attor­
ney's unauthorized admission of the defendant's guilt.148 Because 
144. Id. 
145. See State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 507 (N.C. 1985); State v. House, 456 
S.E.2d 292, 297 (N.C. 1995). For further discussion on the need to make a record of the 
defendant's consent to an admission of guilt, see discussion infra Part III.B. 
146. Anaya, 592 A.2d at 1146. 
147. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding 
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to the states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
148. See Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698 (5th Cir. 1999); Carter v. Johnson, 131 
F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1997); Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1988); People v. 
Lucas, 907 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1995); People v. Cain, 892 P.2d 1224 (Cal. 1995); Nixon v. 
Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000); Abshier v. State, 28 P.3d 579 (Okla. Crim. App. 
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capital trials are bifurcated into guilt and penalty phases,149 defense 
attorneys may consider the defendant's guilt a fairly minor issue­
even a non-issue-compared to the goal of avoiding a death sen­
tence in the penalty phase.150 
Most courts faced with this issue have held that admissions of 
guilt by counsel are reasonable in the context of a death penalty 
defense.151 In Abshier v. State,152 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals held: 
In some circumstances ... where the defendant has con­
fessed and the evidence is overwhelming, it could be reasonable 
trial strategy to candidly concede guilt early in the trial in order 
to establish credibility with the jury in the hope that at least one 
juror can be persuaded to vote for a sentence less than death in 
the penalty stage.153 
The reasoning behind the Abshier decision, and those like it, 
seems to be that defense counsel should be allowed, as a matter of 
trial strategy, to admit what he knows the government can prove in 
order to maintain credibility with the jury for the "critical" penalty 
phase.154 If there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, counse1's ad­
missions cannot prejudice the defendant's case.155 
However, this argument assumes that the penalty phase is 
more "critical" than the guilt phase. Nevertheless, some defendants 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1548 (2002); in re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16 P.3d 1 
(Wash. 2001). 
149. Although the Supreme Court has never expressly required bifurcated trials 
in death penalty cases, the states have interpreted the Court's remarks condoning bifur­
cation as "virtually requiring it." Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. Cr. 
REV. 305,309. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (plurality opinion 
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("As a general proposition, these concerns [ex­
pressed in Furman regarding the arbitrary and capricious administration of capital pun­
ishment] are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding ....") 
(citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972». 
150. See Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1991) (defense counsel stated 
in opening statement, "This case is about the death of Joe Elton Nixon and whether it 
should occur within the next few years by electrocution or maybe its natural expiration 
after a lifetime of confinement"); Abshier, 28 P.3d at 593 ("We are here for sentencing 
and sentencing only ...."). 
151. See, e.g., Kitchens, 190 F.3d at 704; Carter, 131 F.3d at 466; Lucas, 907 P.2d 
at 392; Cain, 892 P.2d at 1241; Abshier, 28 P.3d at 594. 
152. 28 P.3d 579. 
153. Id. at 594. See also Lucas, 907 P.2d at 392 (reasoning that "it is not necessa­
rily incompetent for an attorney to concede his or her client's guilt of a particular of­
fense" when defense counsel knows the prosecution has ample evidence to prove the 
charge). 
154. Abshier, 28 P.3d at 595. 
155. Id. 
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may wish to profess their innocence even at the risk that the jury 
may be alienated and return a death sentence. Consider the com­
plaint of the capital murder defendant in State v. Stenson:156 
[T]hey [Stenson's attorneys] said that unless I agreed to the way 
they wanted to proceed on the trial that they were going to with­
draw and what they wanted to-both their views on the death 
penalty prohibit them from fighting for me. . 
And I want to state that I am not guilty of these charges that 
are against me .... But I was told that because of their views on 
my, the potential of me receiving the death penalty, that they 
would not fight for me .... [B]asically what they wanted to do is 
pussy foot through the trial and concentrate on getting me a life 
sentence ... .157 
Although the trend seems to be to find counsel admissions of 
guilt reasonable in the context of capital defense,158 the Supreme 
Court of Florida bucked the trend with its decision in Nixon v. Sin­
gletary.159 In that case, Nixon appealed his death penalty convic­
tion for first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and arson.160 
During the guilt phase of his trial,161 his attorney admitted Nixon's 
guilt during the opening statement162 and the closing argument.163 
On appeal, Nixon argued that "these comments were the equivalent 
of a guilty plea by his attorney"164 and amounted to ineffective 
representation.165 
The court agreed.166 Although the court recognized that "in 
certain unique situations, counsel for the defense may make a tacti­
156. 940 P.2d 1239 (Wash. 1997) (applying the Strickland standard to uphold the 
defendant's conviction). 
157. Id. at 1286 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (quoting R. of Proceedings (July 13, 
1994) at 3121-22). 
158. See supra notes 151-155. 
159. 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000). 
160. Id. at 619. 
161. Id. at 620. 
162. In his opening statement, Nixon's attorney said, "[T]here won't be any ques­
tion, none whatsoever, that my client ... caused Jeannie [sic] Bickner's death .... [T]hat 
fact will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any reasonable doubt." Nixon v. State, 
572 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1990) (alterations in original). 
163. In closing, Nixon's attorney remarked to the jury, "I wish I could stand 
before you and argue that what happened wasn't caused by Mr. Nixon, but we all know 
better. . . . I think you will find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
each and every element of the crimes charged ...." Id. 
164. Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 620. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 624. See discussion comparing unauthorized admissions of guilt to 
guilty pleas infra Part III.B. 
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cal decision to admit guilt during the guilt phase in an effort to per­
suade the jury to spare the defendant's life during the penalty 
phase,"167 the court held that "the dividing line between a sound 
defense strategy and ineffective assistance of counsel is whether or 
not the client has given his or her consent to such a strategy."168 
Remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing to establish whether 
Nixon consented,169 the court held that the Cronic exception would 
control on remand if Nixon could establish that "he did not consent 
to counsel's strategy."170 
In Nixon, the court grounded its decision in the principle that 
only the defendant can make the fundamental decision to admit 
guilt.l71 The court was unpersuaded that, in light of Nixon's disrup­
tive behavior and the overwhelming evidence against him,l72 coun­
sel's strategy could be considered effective assistance.173 While the 
court recognized that Nixon's trial counsel's strategy might have 
been Nixon's best chance of avoiding the death penalty,174 it sug­
gested that, absent Nixon's consent to admitting guilt, counsel 
should have "[held] the State to its burden of proof by clearly artic­
ulating to the jury. .. that the State must establish each element of 
the crime charged and that a conviction can only be based upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt."175 If this more conservative 
strategy works to the defendant's detriment, he has no one to blame 
but himself.176 
C. 	 Strickland Analysis Appropriately Applied: In re Personal 
Restraint of StensonI77 
In rare circumstances, the two-prong Strickland analysis re­
167. 	 Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 623. 
168. 	 Id. 
169. Id. at 624. The record did not clearly indicate Nixon's lack of consent: he 
was absent from the courtroom for most of his trial, due to his mental illness and dis­
ruptive behavior. Id. at 620 n.3, 628-29, (Anstead, J., concurring). 
170. 	 Id. at 623. 
171. Id. at 624-25. "[T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that the defendant, 
not the attorney, is the captain of the ship. Although the attorney can make some 
tactical decisions, the ultimate choice as to which direction to sail is left up to the defen­
dant." Id. at 625 (citations omitted). 
172. 	 Id. at 625. 
173. 	 Id. 
174. 	 Id. 
175. 	 Id. 
176. 	 Id. (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975), limited by Martinez 
v. Ct. App., 528 U.S. 152 (2000) ("The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will 
bear the personal consequences of a conviction."». 
177. 	 16 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2001). 
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mains the appropriate standard by which to evaluate an ineffective 
assistance claim arising out of counsel's unauthorized concession of 
guilt. In re Personal Restraint of Stenson is one such case. There, 
the defendant asked the Washington Supreme Court to reverse his 
death penalty conviction for the murder of his wife and business 
partner.178 Stenson argued, essentially, that his attorneys consid­
ered the guilt phase of his trial not "winnable"179 and instead con­
centrated their efforts on the penalty phase,180 while Stenson 
wanted his attorneys to do everything possible to prove his inno­
cence.18l Because of this disagreement over the primary objective 
of the trial, Stenson argued that his attorneys' perfunctory han­
dling182 of the guilt phase amounted to a concession of the guilt 
issue.183 
Although one justice dissented,184 believing that Stenson's at­
torneys effectively conceded his guilt,18S the majority of the court 
applied the two-prong Strickland analysis and upheld the convic­
tion.186 In evaluating the reasonableness prong of Strickland, the 
court held that "there is no evidence to suggest that the representa­
tion Stenson received was in any way inadequate."187 Both attor­
neys were experienced188 and communicated regularly with 
Stenson.189 In preparing for the guilt phase, the defense's investiga­
178. /d. at 5. 
179. /d. at 6. 
180. Id. at 8. Stenson complained that the lead attorney assigned to his case 
"spent virtually no time preparing for the jury trial but concentrated instead on mo­
tions, jury selection, and the penalty phase." Id. at 11. 
181. Id. at 8. 
182. Stenson principally objected to counsels' refusa1.to introduce "other suspect" 
evidence that would have suggested that Denise Hoerner, the widow of one of the vic­
tims, actually committed the murders. Id. at 11. His attorneys rejected this tactic be­
cause it was unsupported by the physical evidence, and they feared it would turn the 
jury against Stenson and make a death penalty verdict more likely. Id. Stenson also 
objected to counsels' decision not to call defense witnesses, id. at 18, and to counsels' 
allegedly inadequate preparation for cross-examination of crucial prosecution wit­
nesses, id. at 23-25. 
183. See id. at 26 n.4 & 29 (Sanders, J., dissenting). 
184. Id. at 26. Justice Sanders would have reversed the conviction and presumed 
prejudice based upon the "irreconcilable conflicts" exception to the Strickland stan­
dard. Id. at 26-29. See supra note 52. 
185. Stenson, 16 P.3d at 26. 
186. Id. at 25. 
187. Id. at 12. 
188. Id. at 10. Lead counsel, Attorney Fred Leatherman, had "extensive experi­
ence" in death penalty defense, and co-counsel, David Neupert, though not "death­
penalty qualified," had been co-counsel on several homicide cases. Id. 
189. Id. at 11. Leatherman met with Stenson ten times between October 1993 
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tor billed the court approximately $35,000 for his services.190 At 
trial, defense counsel cross-examined twenty-five of the State's 
thirty-three witnessesl91 and called five defense witnesses. l92 Per­
haps most importantly, defense counsel made no statement ex­
pressly conceding guilt or reasonable doubt until the penalty phase 
of the trial.193 These facts undermined Stenson's claim that the de­
fense mounted by his attorneys was in any way perfunctory; indeed, 
the quality of representation Stenson received seems far superior to 
that given many death penalty defendants represented by ap­
pointed counsel.194 
In cases like Stenson, where the defense counsel's admission is 
not express or even clearly implied, and the trial record reveals that 
defense counsel rigorously held the prosecution to the burden of 
proof, the Strickland analysis is appropriate. In such a case, the 
Sixth Amendment requirement that the prosecution "survive the 
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing"195 has been satisfied, 
and the Cronic exception does not apply .. 
III. JUSTIFYING A CLEAR RULE AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED 

ADMISSIONS BY COUNSEL 

Courts that resist a broader application of the Cronic excep­
tion fear that such application will require an in-depth inquiry into 
the facts of individual cases,l96 thereby undermining what they con­
sider the purpose of the. exception-to identify a narrow class of 
cases in which prejudice may be presumed "without inquiry into 
and January 1994, and Neupert met with Stenson "roughly twice a week" between No­
vember 1993 and June 1994. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 12. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 22. In the penalty phase, counsel told the jury, "[W]e accept your 
verdict without reservation whatsoever." Id. Stenson argued that this statement vio­
lated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but the court held that 
that privilege does not extend to the penalty phase. Id: 
194. See discussion infra Part IILC; see generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for 
the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 
YALE L.J. 1835 (1994); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent De­
fense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995); Margaret H. 
Lemos, Note, Civil Challenges to the Use ofLow-Bid Contracts for Indigent Defense, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1808 (2000); Erika E. Pedersen, Note, You Only Get What You Can Pay 
For: Dziubak v. Mott and Its Warning to the Indigent Defendant, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 
999 (1995). 
195. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984). 
196. See discussion supra Part LC, especially notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
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counsel's actual performance at trial"197-and encouraging in­
creased litigation because trial records on Sixth Amendment ap­
peals would need to be examined in greater detail. 
To some degree, this fear may be warranted. There are many 
contexts in which defense counsel may admit a client's guilt, and 
each case has its own unique facts and circumstances. Broad appli­
cation of the Cronic exception may lead some appellate courts to 
get bogged down in the minutiae of these cases and lose sight of the 
dispositive issue: the reliability of the original conviction.198 How­
ever, applying the Strickland analysis to these cases may actually 
lead to even more litigation; often the trial record must be scruti­
nized to determine, first, whether defense counsel's admission was 
objectively reasonable, and second, whether the defendant suffered 
prejudice. A clear rule establishing that it is never reasonable for 
defense counsel to concede guilt or the absence of reasonable doubt 
to any charged offense without the defendant's consent would re­
solve the vast majority of cases like Swanson and the others ex­
amined in this Note. A simple review of the trial record would 
suffice to demonstrate whether or not a prohibited concession had 
been made. 
More difficult cases where the attorney's concession is not ex­
press or even clearly implied199 may not be resolved by such a rule. 
In such cases, the Strickland two-prong analysis will remain appro­
priate because a perfunctory defense that nevertheless holds the 
government to the burden of proof does not constitute a break­
down in the adversary system. 
The necessity of such a rule is bolstered by already existing 
notions of the attorney-client relationship in the criminal context, 
constitutional protections surrounding the entrance of guilty pleas, 
and public policy reasons. The next section addresses each of these 
justifications in tum. 
A. 	 The Attorney-Client Relationship: Rights and Responsibilities 
of Counsel and Accused 
Our justice system is grounded in the perception that the rela­
tionship between counsel and accused is a somewhat collaborative 
one, in which certain fundamental decisions are reserved for the 
197. 	 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662. 
198. 	 See, e.g., Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1994). 
199. See, e.g., In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16 P.3d 1, 9-10 (Wash. 2001). 
See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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accused,zoo while other decisions are the province of defense coun­
sel.201 This understanding of the attorney-client relationship lays 
the groundwork for a clear rule precluding unauthorized admissions 
of guilt by counsel. Such a rule would reflect the principle that ef­
fective representation must comport with the basic responsibilities 
of defense counsel without encroaching upon the fundamental 
rights of the defendant. 
Defense counsel's overarching function is to ensure that the 
defendant receives a fair trial.202 This function involves certain ba­
sic duties. Counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty and must avoid 
conflicts of interest.203 Counsel must serve as an advocate for the 
defendant, rather than a friend of the court.204 Arising out of the 
role of advocate are more particular duties, such as the duty to 
"consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the 
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the 
prosecution."205 Counsel must also provide the skill and knowledge 
necessary to ensure reliable adversarial testing of the prosecution's 
case at trial.2°6 
Beyond this, there are guidelines establishing which tactical de­
200. See infra notes 209-213. 
201. See infra notes 207-208. 
202. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). "[T]his Court has 
recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to 
protect the fundamental right to a fair trial." Id. at 684. 
203. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,346 (1980). Although tactical disputes 
between the attorney and client are not traditionally characterized as conflicts of inter­
est, the Cuyler test is beginning to be raised in this context. In Osborn v. Shillinger, the 
Tenth Circuit stated: 
A defense attorney who abandons his duty of loyalty to his client and effec­
tively joins the state in an effort to attain a conviction or death sentence suf­
fers from an obvious conflict of interest. . . . In fact, an attorney who is 
burdened by a conflict between his client's interests and his own sympathies to 
the prosecution's position is considerably worse than an attorney with loyalty 
to other defendants, because the interests of the state and the defendant are 
necessarily in opposition. 
861 F.2d 612, 629 (10th Cir. 1988). See also In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16 P.3d 
1, 8-9 (majority opinion), & 29 (Sanders, J., dissenting). 
Those who would apply conflict of interest analysis to tactical admissions of guilt 
by counsel argue that "ultimately there are some decisions reserved to the client, even 
when his lawyer honestly ... believes the client fails to promote his self-interest in the 
best possible fashion." Stenson, 16 P.3d at 29 n.7. 
204. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also Ferri v. Ackerman, 
444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (stating that "[i]ndeed, an indispensable element of the effec­
tive performance of his responsibilities is the ability to act independently of the govern­
ment and to oppose it in adversary litigation"). 
205. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
206. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). 
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clSlons are within the attorney's sole discretion. The ABA Stan­
dards for Criminal Justice provides such guidelines: 
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ulti­
mately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be 
made by the accused after full consultation with counsel are: . 
(i) what plea to enter; 
(ii) whether to waive jury trial; and 
(iii) whether to testify in his or her own behalf. 
(b) The decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to 
conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, 
what trial motions should be made, and all other strategic and 
tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer af­
ter consultation with the client.207 
These guidelines create the inference that so long as the attorney 
does not infringe upon the enumerated rights of the defendant, all 
reasonable tactical decisions are permissible. But the ABA guide­
lines also suggest that the lawyer must reach these decisions "after 
consultation with the client. "208 
As provided by the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice, a 
number of fundamental decisions are reserved for the defendant.209 
The decision of how to plead, for example, must be made solely by 
the defendant, based on his intelligent and voluntary choice.210 To 
insure that the plea is voluntary and intelligent, the trial court must 
make an on-the-record inquiry of the defendant.211 The defendant 
also has ultimate authority as to whether to waive a jury trial, testify 
on his or her own behalf, or to take an appeal.212 . 
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly so held, 
many lower federal courts and state courts interpret the Sixth 
207. 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5) (2d ed. Supp. 1986) (em­
phasis added). 
208. !d. 
209. Id. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.2(a) (2001) ("In a 
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the 
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will 
testify. "). 
210. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). In Boykin, the Supreme Court 
held that because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of several constitutional rights­
specifically the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth 
Amendment rights to trial by jury and to confront one's accusers-that cannot be pre­
sumed from a silent record, courts must conduct an on-the-record inquiry of the ac­
cused "to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its 
consequence." !d. at 243-44. 
211. !d. 
212. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 
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Amendment as granting the defendant a right to decide, within the 
range of permissible defenses, the type of defense he wishes to 
mount.213 The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide 
that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the 
objectives of representation ... and shall consult with the client as 
to the means by which they are to be pursued. "214 Without afford­
ing the defendant total control over his defense, the Supreme Court 
in Strickland observed that "[c]ounsel's actions are usually based, 
quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defen­
dant and on information supplied by the defendant."215 
These professional guidelines and case law suggest that the at­
torney-client relationship ought to be a collaborative one, in which 
there is no firm rule that matters of strategy are left solely to the 
attorney's discretion, and decisions integral to the objectives of rep­
resentation should be made by the defendant after receiving the 
advice of counsel. A clear rule that counsel may not make unau­
thorized concessions of guilt would comport with these traditional 
conceptions of the attorney-client relationship and would not in­
fringe upon counsel's autonomy in making strategic decisions be­
yond those limits already recommended by current standards of 
criminal representation. 
B. Counsel's Admission Is Tantamount to a Guilty Plea 
In Nixon v. Singletary,216 the Supreme Court of Florida held 
that defense counsel's admissions of his client's guilt during his 
opening statement217 and closing argument218 "were the functional 
equivalent of a guilty plea."219 A concession of guilt by counsel 
213. See, e.g., Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 625 (Fla. 2000) (making ex­
tended metaphor of trial as ship voyage, with defendant as captain, with "ultimate 
choice as to which direction to sail"); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1147 (Kan. 2000) 
("The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the 
accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. It is the 
accused, not counsel, who must be 'informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,' 
who must be 'confronted with witnesses against him,' and who must be accorded 'com­
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.'" (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806, 819 (1975»; State v. Benn, 845 P.2d 289, 308-09 (Wash. 1993) (finding that it 
was not unreasonable trial strategy for an attorney to accede to defendant's wishes as to 
how to conduct the defense at trial, even though the tactic ultimately proved 
unsuccessful). 
214. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.2(a) (2000). 
215. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). 
216. 758 So. 2d 618, 634 (Fla. 2000). See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
217. See Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1990). 
218. Id. 
219. Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 624. See also State v. Gordon, 641 N.W.2d 183 (Wis. Ct. 
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deprives the defendant of his "constitutional right to have his guilt 
or innocence decided by the jury,"220 a right reserved by the defen­
dant when he enters a plea of "not guilty" and makes the decision 
to proceed to trial.221 In pleading "not guilty," a defendant makes 
it clear "that he intends to hold the government to strict proof be­
yond a reasonable doubt as to the offense charged,"222 and a con­
cession of guilt by counsel, no matter how well-reasoned the 
strategy behind it, alleviates the government of this burden. 
Because counsel's admission of guilt is the functional 
equivalent of a guilty plea by the defendant, a rule prohibiting such 
an admission should provide a procedure for documenting the de­
fendant's consent. Failure to define such a procedure will likely re­
sult in case-by-case litigation necessary to determine whether and 
how a defendant manifested his consent. The Nixon court required 
that, when a trial court knows or suspects defense counsel's strategy 
requires conceding guilt or the absence of reasonable doubt, the 
judge should make an on-the-record examination of the defendant 
to ensure that the defendant has given his independent, informed 
consent to counsel's strategy.223 This examination is the same as 
that required of defendants entering a guilty plea,224 and it should 
App. 2002). In Gordon, the court held that "a defense attorney need not say the magic 
words 'my client has decided to plead guilty,' before a court may conclude that defense 
counsel unconstitutionally waived a defendant's right to plead not guilty." Id. at 195 
(citing Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 474 (7th Cir. 1991». But see United States v. 
Gomes, 177 F.3d 76, 83-84 (1st Cir. 1999) (evaluating counsel's concession of gUilt 
under the Strickland prejudice standard). In Gomes, the First Circuit commented that 
"[c]ounsel's concession was not a guilty plea, which involves conviction without proof, 
and is therefore properly hedged with protections. Here, the government had to pro­
vide a jury with admissible evidence of guilt and did so in abundance." Id. at 84. 
There is also an argument that, in jurisdictions where the jury determines the sen­
tence as well as the issue of guilt, an attorney's admission of guilt cannot be equated 
with a gUilty plea because, despite the attorney's concession, the defendant retains the 
right to be sentenced by the jury. See Abshier v. State, 28 P.3d 579, 597 n.7 (Okla. 
Crirn. App. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1548 (2002). 
220. Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 623 (quoting Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 650 (6th 
Cir. 1981». 
221. Wiley, 647 F.2d at 650 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969». 
222. Id. (citing Byrd v. United States, 342 F.2d 939, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1965». 
223. Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 625. See also Wiley, 647 F.2d at 650 (holding that "[i]n 
those rare cases where counsel advises his client that the latter's guilt should be admit­
ted, the client's knowing consent to such trial strategy must appear outside the presence 
of the jury on the trial record in the manner consistent with Boykin") (referring to 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), see discussion supra note 210); State v. House, 
456 S.E.2d 292, 297 (N.C. 1995) (urging "both the bar and the trial bench to be diligent 
in making a full record of a defendant's consent when a Harbison issue arises at trial") 
(referring to State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504 (N.C. 1985». 
224. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-44. 
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be utilized to establish a defendant's consent to counsel's admission 
because the consequences of such an admission are indistinguish­
able from the consequences of entering a guilty plea. 
Some courts have held that a plea-like waiver recording the 
defendant's intelligent and voluntary consent is not necessary when 
defense counsel admits the client's guilt. These courts believe that 
the defendant's silence at trial while counsel makes the admission 
demonstrates acquiescence.225 Unfortunately, this silent waiver ap­
proach fails to recognize that the defendant might feel too intimi­
dated to speak out of turn and object, or may not understand the 
import and effect of counsel's statements until the window of op­
portunity to object has passed.226 
Moreover, in Cronic, the Supreme Court suggested that the 
measure of effective assistance is independent of the defendant's 
subjective opinion of his counsel's performance, commenting: 
If counsel is a reasonably effective advocate, he meets constitu­
tional standards irrespective of his client's evaluation of his per­
formance. It is for this reason that we attach no weight to either 
respondent's expression of satisfaction with counsel's perform­
ance at the time of his trial, or to his later expression of 
dissatisfaction.227 
225. See Abshier v. State, 28 P.3d 579, 598 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (finding that 
"[a]ppellant acquiesced in the trial strategy of his counsel where he made no effort at 
any time during the trial to express to the judge his disagreement with the strategy"), 
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1548 (2002); People v. Cain, 892 P.2d 1224, 1241 (Cal. 1995) 
(commenting that "[i]t is not the trial court's duty to inquire whether the defendant 
agrees with his counsel's decision to make a concession, at least where, as here, there is 
no explicit indication the defendant disagrees with his attorney's tactical approach "); 
State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Minn. 1992) (noting that "[f]rom his opening state­
ment through his closing argument, defense counsel consistently took the position that 
defendant had caused the victim's death. At no time does the record disclose that de­
fendant had any objection to or dissatisfaction with this trial strategy"). 
The issue of whether an on-the-record waiver is advisable or necessary when coun­
sel pursues a strategy admitting guilt remains an open question in the First Circuit. See 
United States v. Gomes, 177 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 1999) (failing to reach the question of 
"whether and when a defendant's consent ... to a course of action might be relevant to 
an ineffective assistance claim," because such an argument could not be supported by 
the record of the case at bar). 
226. There is a similar debate regarding whether waiver of a defendant's right to 
testify may be demonstrated by a silent record. Compare United States v. McMeans, 
927 F.2d 162, 163 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curium) (requiring defendant to protest his law­
yer's action denying the right to testify to the judge during trial), and United States v. 
Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 928 F.2d 1470 
(9th. Cir 1991), with People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514-15 (Colo. 1984) (requiring the 
judge to inquire of the defendant directly whether he wants to testify), and State v. 
Neuman, 371 S.E.2d 77, 81-82 (W.Va. 1988). 
227. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984) (citation omitted). 
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If the defendant's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with counsel's 
performance is not germane to the question of whether the consti­
tutional standards of effective assistance have been met, it serves no 
purpose to require that the defendant express his dissatisfaction at 
trial in order to preserve an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
for appeal. A clear rule requiring trial courts to conduct a colloquy 
to record the defendant's consent to a strategy that concedes guilt is 
necessary to eliminate time consuming and counterproductive liti­
gation over whether or not the defendant's silence at trial consti­
tuted a waiver. 
C. 	 The Nexus Between Indigent Defense and Ineffective 
Assistance 
When reviewing cases involving an unauthorized admission of 
guilt by counsel, a disturbing pattern emerges. Most of these cases 
involve court-appointed representation,228 and, by implication, indi­
gent defendants whose socio-economic disadvantage makes them 
dependent upon appointed counsel to assist with their defense. 
The nexus between indigent defense and (in)adequacy of rep­
resentation is well documented and much lamented.229 Public de­
fense programs are notoriously overburdened and under-funded,230 
which degrades the quality of representation.231 Due to inadequate 
compensation and excessive caseloads, public defenders often lack 
228. Frequently, appellate decisions addressing attorney admissions of guilt ex­
pressly note that trial counsel was court-appointed. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 
5 (1965); Haynes v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757, 759 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'd en bane, 298 F.3d 375 
(5th Cir. 2002); Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 699 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 1991); Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 614 
(10th Cir. 1988); Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1981); State v. Carter, 14 
P.3d 1138, 1141 (Kan. 2000); State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 506 (N.C. 1985); State v. 
Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1143 (N.H. 1991); State v. Stenson, 940 P.2d 1239, 1270 (Wash. 
1997), affd, In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2001). Although 
many decisions make no mention of whether defense counsel was appointed, my re­
search only uncovered one case where the court specifically noted that defense counsel 
was privately retained, State v. Wiplinger, 343 N.W.2d 858, 859 (Minn. 1984). 
229. See generally David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New 
Theory on Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469 
(1992); Erika E. Pedersen, You Only Get What You Can Pay For: Dziubak v. Mott and 
Its Warning to the Indigent Defendant, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 999 (1995); Douglas W. 
Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death 
Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995). 
230. 	 Pedersen, supra note 229, at 1003-07. 
231. Id. As one court has observed, "The relationship between an attorney's 
compensation and the quality of his or her representation cannot be ignored." White v. 
Bd. of Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 1989). 
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the time and resources to interview all witnesses, investigate facts 
thoroughly, and file all appropriate pretrial motions.232 Without 
the ability to perform such vital and basic investigative and prepara­
tory tasks, public defenders have no choice but to rely on the gov­
ernment to produce all of the relevant facts of the case?33 
. The impact of the indigent defense crisis on the issue of unau­
thorized admissions of guilt by counsel is readily apparent. Without 
adequate resources to investigate and prepare alternate theories of 
defense, appointed counsel may see no alternative but to accept the 
prosecution's evidence of guilt and concede reasonable doubt at 
trial. 
Likewise, overworked public defenders often do not have the 
time for lengthy consultations with clients to establish an under­
standing of the client's defense objectives. At best, these attorneys 
may not even realize that their client does not understand or ap­
prove of the strategy to concede guilt at trial. At worst, they may 
not care: defense counsel may take a patronizing view of their indi­
gent and often uneducated clients and may believe that the better 
course is to follow their own more experienced judgment about 
how to proceed with the case. Defense counsel's decision to pursue 
a strategy requiring a concession of guilt may be exacerbated when 
the client is a member of a minority group234 or, though competent 
to stand trial, has only marginal mental competency.235 
232. Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled 
to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 369 (1993). 
233. The facts of United States v. Cronic illustrate this problem: there, the court­
appointed attorney had less than one month to prepare a defense against charges aris­
ing out of a complicated "check-kiting scheme," while the government took more than 
four years to investigate the crime. 466 U.S. 648, 649-50. The Supreme Court stated 
that this discrepancy did not violate the constitutional requirement of effective assis­
tance of counsel, since "[a] competent attorney would have no reason to question the 
authenticity, accuracy, or relevance of [the government's] evidence." Id. at 664. How­
ever, the nature of the adversarial justice system requires competent defense attorneys 
to do just that. 
234. See Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13 (11th Cir. 1982) (defense 
counsel referred to defendant as a "little old nigger boy" at the close of state's presenta­
tion of documentary evidence during sentencing phase of trial); Ex Parte Guzmon, 730 
S.W.2d 724, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (defense counsel referred to El Salvadoran 
client as "wet back" in front of jury). While these decisions do not involve admissions 
of gUilt by counsel, they exemplify racially-motivated contempt for and condescension 
toward clients. 
235. Several cases concerning an unauthorized concession of guilt by counsel in­
volve defendants of dubious mental competency. See Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 
701-02 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that defense counsel's failure to present evidence of 
defendant's hospitalizations for suicidal behavior and hallucinations was not prejudi­
cial); Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 627-29 (Fla. 2000) (Anstead, J., concurring) 
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CONCLUSION 
Prejudice analysis under Strickland will almost always be fatal 
to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by defendants whose 
attorneys admit their guilt. After all, if these defendants could not 
convince their own attorneys to argue their innocence at trial, there 
is virtually no likelihood that an appellate court will find a reasona­
ble probability that, but for counsel's admission, the defendant 
would not have been convicted.236 But whether or not the defen­
dant should have been convicted is not the right standard by which 
to judge ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from de­
fense counsel's unauthorized concession of guilt. 
Like Joe Elton Nixon237 and Steven Abshier,238 many of the 
defendants whose attorneys pursue a guilt-conceding tactic have 
committed terrible crimes, and ought to be convicted-but the de­
fendant's guilt or innocence is really beside the point. The atrocity 
of their crimes, their inability to hire their own attorneys, their race, 
their mental illnesses-these factors do not justify suspending de­
fendants' constitutional rights to a fair trial, presumption of inno­
cence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and especially, to effective 
representation. Society needs people like Nixon and Abshier to be 
convicted, but they should be convicted because the government's 
case has "survive[d] the crucible of meaningful adversarial test­
ing,"239 not because their attorneys made the decision, for whatever 
reason, to abandon their role as the defendant's advocate in our 
adversarial criminal justice system by conceding the defendant's 
guilt to the jury. 
Heidi H. Woessner 
(arguing that defense counsel's failure to request a competency hearing in light of de­
fendant's bizarre and disruptive behavior provided an alternate basis for reversing de­
fendant's murder conviction), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 980 (2000); State v. Provost, 490 
N.W.2d 93, 95 (Minn. 1992) (involving a schizophrenic defendant). 
236. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
237. See Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000). Nixon was convicted of 
kidnapping, murder, and arson after accosting a woman, stealing her jewelry and her 
car, tying her to a tree, and setting her on fire. Id. at 629-30 (Wells, J., dissenting). 
238. See Abshier v. State, 28 P.3d 579 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001), cert. denied, 122 
S. Ct. 1548 (2002). Abshier was convicted of child abuse murder in the death of his 
twenty-two month old daughter, Ashley. 
239. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984). 
